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1.  Introduction. 
You measure the temperature of a glass of water and say that the outcome is accurate – is 
right – to within a tenth of a degree. What does this mean?  Presumably that there is some 
number that is, say, the temperature of the water in degrees Centigrade, and that the 
measurement outcome is within one tenth of a degree of that true value.  The present 
paper will work to undermine this supposition, though at the very end I will present a 
way of understanding such statements that is consistent with all the difficulties that will 
have come before. 
1.1  Restrictions.  
I will restrict attention to physical quantities, though most of what I say should apply, 
with suitable modifications, to both the life and the social sciences.  I will also restrict 
attention to quantities, such as mass and temperature, that can be represented with a 
measurement scale of real numbers, as opposed, for example, to curvature that requires a 
tensor.  But what I discuss explicitly should apply also to such multivariable quantities.   
1.2  Initial characterization of measurement accuracy.  To fix on our target, we need 
to review some basics.  
First one distinguishes between measurement indications and measurement outcomes:  
An indication is “what is shown on the meter”.  But often such an indication can be 
corrected on a theoretical basis.  A measurement outcome is the final result after such 
interpretation.  Throughout I will have measurement outcomes in mind. 
One can attribute accuracy to any of measurement indications, outcomes, the instruments 
used to produce indications, and the entire measurement system comprised by the 
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instrument and the theoretical basis used for interpretation.  While much of what I will 
have to say will apply to all of these, we are best off, again, taking measurement 
outcomes as our primary target. 
Accuracy must be distinguished from precision: The standard analogy refers to arrows 
shot at a target.  The outcomes are accurate to the extent that they are close to the bulls-
eye.  They are precise to the extent to which they cluster closely together.  So 
measurement can be extremely precise without being very accurate.2 
I take the default understanding of measurement-accuracy to be what I will call 
“traditional measurement accuracy realism”.  One supposes that there are in nature 
things, such as lumps of lead and glasses of water, kinds of things, such as lead and 
water, and quantities that pertain to things and kinds, such as mass, length, temperature, 
and time (pertaining to duration of processes); and one supposes that in concrete cases 
such quantities have values.  Stated generally: 
Traditional measurement accuracy realism (stated schematically for measurement 
of quantity, Q, with possible values, q in units, u3, on an object or type of object, 
O): 
Presupposition: There is in nature the quantity, Q, with value q in units, u, 
for object or type of object, O.  
Then q’, a measurement outcome of Q in units u on O, counts as 
a) Perfectly accurate: q’ = q 
b) Accurate (enough):  the outcome, q’, is close enough to q for present 
purposes 
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c) Outcome q’ is more accurate than outcome q’’:  q’ is closer to q than is 
q’’. 
Accuracy understood in the traditional way is supposed to be an objective, not an 
epistemic matter.  Realists will agree that accuracy can be estimated but not exactly 
known, but insist that there is nonetheless a fact of the matter, just how accurate, in the 
traditional sense, a given measurement outcome is.   
2.  Problems with traditional measurement accuracy realism.  
2.1  General statement of the problem.   
Traditional measurement accuracy realism fails because the terms used in the relevant 
statement instances fail to refer.  We use terms for quantities and their values:  “The 
temperature of the water in this glass”. Traditional measurement accuracy realism 
suppose that there is “in nature” some determinate quantity, temperature, or more 
specifically, the temperature of the water in this glass, that in this instance has some 
determinate value, say  20.258743…ºC.  My claim is that the term, ‘the temperature of 
the water in this glass’, does not have a referent.  My reason is not in any way 
metaphysical.  It is simply that the full facts of language use and circumstances of 
utterance fail to pick out any one thing to be the named quantity, temperature, or any one 
number to be the claimed value of the claimed quantity. While we will see a complex of 
detailed reasons for this failure, at bottom they are all consequences of the contingent 
circumstance that the world is far too complex for our language to get attached to 
completely determinate things, in particular, quantities and their value instances. 
I must dwell on the form of my complaint because it is entirely different from what one 
usually hears from those known as anti-realists, and my argument will be misunderstood 
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if the reader falls back into thinking that I am attacking conventional realism in a familiar 
way.4  I am not claiming that there are no quantities with exact values in nature, nor, as 
some anti-realists would have it, that the whole idea of “things in nature” is incoherent. 5  
Indeed, there is no coherence problem in such statements because we can model what this 
would be like.  
Rather, to repeat for emphasis, the problem is one of reference failure.  Such determinate 
quantities as there may be fail to get attached to quantity terms, such as ‘time’, ‘mass’, 
‘length’, ‘velocity’, ‘temperature’.  With no determinate quantities attached to such 
terms, there are no determinate values for “them” to have.  In addition, even if we 
suppose that the quantity terms do refer, we will see that determinate reference for terms 
purportedly referring to their values would fail anyway.  We will also see difficulties with 
reference for terms for units, such as ‘kilogram’, ‘meter’, and ‘second’.   
The problem is also not epistemic in the sense that presupposes that our terms for 
quantities and their values do refer, but that there are problems in knowing just what 
those values are.  Rather the claim is failure of the presupposition, that the relevant terms 
have been successfully attached to determinate referents. 
One immediate reaction is to say, well there are no point-valued referents, but we can 
always make do with an interval.  But how is this interval to be understood?  What one 
always has in mind is that the true value lies somewhere in the interval.  But that takes us 
back to the questioned exact valued referents.  In section 2.6 I will examine questions 
about intervals in more detail. 
2.2 Reference failure source points.  
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There are different kinds of problems for three different kinds of what I will call 
“reference failure source points”. The first is comprised by quantities in the sense of a 
dimension as used in dimensional analysis.  Mass, length, and time are usually taken as 
fundamental, and they figure in the characterization of other quantities, such as velocity, 
that has the dimensions of length divided by time.  I will refer to these collectively as 
“dimensional quantities”.  Dimensional quantities are theoretically individuated, that is 
identified by the role that they play in our theories.6 
Our next reference failure source point is the units used in characterizing a quantity.  
Without determinate units, no determinate quantity can have been picked out. Even if we 
had succeeded in specifying some quantity, say one called ‘mass’, just what quantity is in 
question is still open until we have said whether it is mass in kilograms, in grams, or 
some other unit. When traditional measurement accuracy realists postulate an 
independently existing value for a quantity of an object on an occasion, where objective 
accuracy is some measure of the difference between this and a measurement outcome, the 
independently existing value and the measurement outcome must be understood in terms 
of the same units.  
Finally, I will need to distinguish between dimensional quantities and what I will call 
“working quantities”.  Velocity is something abstract:  Velocity of what? Velocity, or its 
absolute value speed, of sound in air is relatively speaking concrete; and speed of sound 
in air and speed of water in a pipe are different concretizations of the abstract, speed.   
One usually does not distinguish between the abstract dimensional and the, relatively 
speaking, concrete working quantities. In particular, metrologists appear to refer 
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indifferently to dimensional and working quantities as measurands, for example, VIM: 
2.3 7 
Measurand:  quantity intended to be measured. 
But the distinction does tacitly occur in both VIM and GUM.  VIM, 0.1: 
[E]ven the most refined measurement cannot reduce the interval [that can 
reasonably be attributed to the measurand] to a single value because of the finite 
amount of detail in the definition of a measurand. 
If one has dimensional quantities in mind, this statement puzzles because of absence of 
any concrete mention of refinement of “definitions” of dimensional quantities. However 
we see what is in question in GUM.  GUM echoes VIM with: 
D.1.1: The first step in making a measurement is to specify the measurand — the 
quantity to be measured; the measurand cannot be specified by a value but only 
by a description of a quantity. However, in principle, a measurand cannot be 
completely described without an infinite amount of information…. 
What is in question becomes clear with the following example,  D.1.2: 
Commonly, the definition of a measurand specifies certain physical states and 
conditions. EXAMPLE The velocity of sound in dry air of composition (mole 
fraction) N2 = 0.7808, O2 = 0.2095, Ar = 0.00935, and CO2 = 0.00035 at the 
temperature T = 273.15ºK and pressure p = 101,325 Pa. 
What is the infinite amount of information here referenced?  Conceivably an indefinitely 
long list of such potentially relevant characteristics.  But more likely it is the interval left 
open by all such specifications.  It is understood that temperature is being specified as T = 
273.15ºK  +/- .005ºK, etc. 
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In any case, I need the distinction between abstract dimensional and (relatively) concrete 
working quantities because there are vastly different problems that arise for the two. 
When working quantities are in question there will be some differences between type and 
completely concrete token cases.  When discussing the speed of sound in air or the 
melting point of lead one has in mind characterization of the a property of a kind of 
substance – air or lead as a type.  But one also needs to measure quantities for concrete 
instances – tokens - such as the speed of sound in the air in the Sydney Opera House at 
some specified time, or the temperature of the water in some specified glass at a specified 
time. 
2.3 Difficulties with working quantities.   
As relatively concrete realizations of dimensional quantities, whatever problems will 
arise for dimensional quantities will, ipso facto, apply as problems for their concrete 
realizations.  But working quantities present additional difficulties.  Roughly speaking, 
these difficulties arise in either how their dimensional abstractions are made concrete or 
from the fact that they are not made completely concrete.  To make these additional 
difficulties clear, for the discussion of working quantities we will take their dimensional 
abstractions as given and unproblematic. 
When working quantities are in question there will be some differences between type and 
token cases.  When discussing the speed of sound in air or the melting point of lead one 
has in mind characterization of the a property of a kind of substance – air or lead as a 
type.  But one also needs to measure quantities for completely concrete instances – 
tokens - such as the speed of sound in the air in the Sydney Opera House, or the 
temperature of the water in some specified glass, both at specified times.  
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Taking token cases first, consider a measurement of the speed of sound in the air in the 
Sydney Opera House at 8:00pm Jan 1, 2013.  There are two difficulties.  First, just what 
will we count as part of the Opera House?  Include the vestibule?  Oh, you’ll protest, 
obvious what was intended was the auditorium of the Opera House.  But to no avail. With 
the door open or shut?  Filled with an audience or empty? Any specification of a concrete 
object will leave it open to some extent precisely what object is in question. Having failed 
to designate a determinate concrete object, there can be no determinate value that “it” 
actually has. 
Second, the speed of sound will vary from one part of the Opera House (or the 
auditorium of the Opera House, or the….) to another.  For example, speed of sound 
varies with temperature, and the temperature won’t be absolutely constant throughout. 
There will be edge effects…. 
Turning to type cases for working quantities:  This is the problem from VIM and GUM 
quoted above.  The problem could be understood in two ways.  First, “speed of sound in 
air” is open ended, as is “speed of sound in air at temperature  T = 273.15ºK”, and 
likewise “speed of sound in air at temperature  T = 273.15ºK and pressure p = 101,325 
Pa”.  Could this list be continued indefinitely with more and more relevant features?  
Possibly, but that’s a bit implausible, so let it pass.   
But second, how are the specifications to be understood?  As mentioned above, most 
plausibly with a temperature of +/- .005ºK and pressure +/- .5 Pa;  and values in the 
intervals will give rise to different speeds of sound.8  One could, on the other hand, take 
the specific characteristics of temperature and pressure to be intended as completely 
precise.  But no real world sample of air has such precise values, if only because the 
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values would vary slightly from place to place.  So at best one is talking about the speed 
of sound in air at… in some idealized condition, not in the real world.   
2.4  Units.  
The characterization of units presents a whole new raft of problems.  Except for the 
kilogram, fundamental units are now defined using a theoretical definition.  For example, 
currently 
The second is the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground 
state of the cesium 133 atom… This definition refers to a cesium atom at rest at a 
temperature of 0ºK.9 
This definition involves a number of idealizations.10 Before getting specific I need to 
separate out the kind of problems that will be in question for us. 
To operate as a standard such an idealized theoretical definition has to be realized in 
some concrete piece of apparatus that will in practice function as the standard, and so 
doing involves deidealization from the theoretical definition.  One first constructs the 
needed apparatus so as to minimize as far as possible the departure from the idealized 
definition, and one then further deidealizes using theory based adjustment of the 
indications physically produced by such instruments.11 
This need for practical deidealization in physical realization of a standard differs from the 
implication of idealization that we will now consider.  The practical case concerns the 
operation of some concrete device.  In examining traditional measurement accuracy 
realism we are concerned with, rather, whether the theoretical definition succeeds in 
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picking out a referent, picking out some real world characteristic, quite independently of 
the question of whether that characteristic can in practice be exactly realized.   
The form of the problem is that the idealizations involved in a definition of a unit mean 
that the definition is of a unit in an idealized situation, speaking metaphorically, in a non-
actual “possible world”.  There is no guarantee that what is picked out for one or more 
such non-actual possible worlds will correspond in the way needed to any one 
determinate referent in the real world.  Examination of cases shows that this is exactly 
what is in question.12 
Let’s consider first the one unit that is still “defined” by a physical standard, the kilogram 
characterized in terms of the international prototype kilogram.  Taking this as a perfectly 
precise characterization of what mass will count as a kilogram involves idealizing away 
variable factors, such as contaminants from the air and scratches induced when the 
prototype is handed in making replicas, both problems that managers struggle to 
minimize but can never completely eliminate.  Strictly speaking, sublimation of the 
material of which the prototype is composed has also to be idealized away. Or, if one 
refrains from such idealization, there is no one mass that the prototype picks out over 
time because the complications such as the ones just mentioned mean that the mass of the 
prototype varies up and down.  Even at one time there is no completely determinate real 
world mass that is picked out – for the same reason that gave rise to one of the 
complications for token cases of working quantities:  Absolutely precisely, just what is, 
even at a fixed time, THE prototype? No one answer to this question will pick out an 
object that will provide the kind of standard that we assume.  A policy either of including 
or of not including the present scratches picks out, at best, a standard that will be different 
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as soon as the prototype is handled.  Or to give a circumstance that is utterly 
inconsequential in practice, strictly speaking relative motion of exactly zero is an 
idealization.  Real world uses will involve relative motion, and so an indeterminacy in 
what is in question: rest or relativistic mass, and if the latter, which one?  Utterly 
inconsequential in practice, but the realist requires a completely precise value. 
Other standards are defined theoretically.  Consider the theoretical definition of the 
second, just above.  This definition ignores the time energy uncertainty relation that 
results in spectrum bandwidth.  Given the bandwidth, the definition does not pick out any 
unique real world temporal duration.  Or again, appeal to a temperature of 0ºK.  Nothing 
in the real world can be at 0ºK, nor can 0ºK be approached asymptotically because of the 
finite limit imposed by quantum vacuum fluctuations.  At best the definition characterizes 
a temporal duration in some possible world.  In fact in many possible worlds since there 
is no unique way in which the idealizations can be removed (What will a possible world 
with no quantum effects be like??)  There will be no sense to be made of which of such 
possible worlds is “closest” to the actual world, so appeal to “closest world” won’t pick 
out a unique real world temporal interval.   
We’re not done.  The theories, general relativity and quantum field theory, used in the 
theoretical definition are themselves idealizations - two theories that are not unified, and 
of which it is at least questionable whether they are mutually consistent.  These 
idealizations provide further reasons why, strictly speaking, the definition only gives a 
temporal interval in some, or really in many, possible worlds.   
Definition of the meter also fails to deliver the completely determinate length that realists 
require.  BIPM gives the definition of the meter as 
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The meter is the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time 
interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.13 
This definition inherits all the problems of the definition of the second.  It involves the 
further idealization of the speed of light in vacuuo, and the idealization of general 
relativity applies anew, now through its ideal treatment of distance.   
2.5 Dimensional quantities.  
I’ve saved the most vexed case for last, the case of dimensional quantities. As I 
mentioned, dimensional quantities are individuated by the theories in which variables for 
these quantities occur.  But the theories in question are all idealized.  So in the real world  
there are no quantities as characterized in the real worldin our idealized theories.  If they 
occur anywhere, it will be (again, speaking metaphorically) in the idealized possible 
worlds of the characterizing theories.   
Take the example of mass.  Is this supposed to be Newtonian mass?  Relativistic mass?  
The mass of quantum field theory that is a renormalized quantity and so dependent on the 
“impact parameter” involved in its measurement?   Quantum field theory is still highly 
idealized, so there is good reason to think that further deidealization will further 
recharacterize just what quantity is in question. 
One wants to protest:  These increasingly accurate characterizations are all of one 
quantity of which our theories are giving an increasingly faithful account.  I will discuss 
the “close to” worry in a general way below.  But the example of mass helps to make 
clear the weakness of the response. The mass of quantum field theory is so different from 
that of Newton that the idea that we are just refining an already very clear idea looses all 
plausibility.  The ONLY constraint on further deidealization is that old successes be 
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preserved.  These old successes may be preserved by radically new ideas of quantities.  
This can happen by the operation of a limit.  In the relation between special relativity and 
Newtonian mechanics, one gets the latter from the former by letting v/c go to zero.  But 
that doesn’t make the Lorenztian metric and its geometry just a refinement of Euclidean 
geometry.   
Let’s try time:  Our best theory of time is the general theory of relativity (GTR).  But 
GTR is not quantized and current efforts to quantize GTR play havoc with the treatment 
of time. We don’t know the outcome of this story, but at the very least there is the lively 
possibility that a better theory characterizing time may characterize it as differently from 
GTR as quantum field theory characterizes mass as compared to Newtonian or relativistic 
mass.   
Let’s try another quantity, velocity.  Velocity doesn’t occur as a quantity in quantum 
theories.  When we can ignore quantum corrections one takes speed (magnitude of 
velocity) to be the limit of average speed.  But the limit of averages is another 
idealization, one that breaks down badly even before we get to quantum corrections.  And 
if by speed we mean an average speed, which average?  
What about length?  When one takes into account the indeterminateness of relative 
position as characterized in quantum theories, there is no such quantity.  Indeed, in 
quantum theories length, or (relative) position, is characterized as an operator not as a 
real valued quantity, again, a radical departure from prior conceptions.  Likewise in 
quantum theories momentum is a radically different kind of quantity from prior classical 
characterizations, like quantum mechanical position also characterized by an operator, 
not by a real number. These few words paper over a great many complications, but 
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should be enough to show that there are serious issues for the case of both position and 
momentum. 
2.6.  Repair by appeal to intervals? The realist in us all is screaming: True, no 
objectively occurring precise values are attached to our terms. But, objectively, suitable 
intervals (or other collections of values) can do the needed realist work.  Here I consider 
this option, construed in terms of completely determinate collections of values, that is, 
collections for which, for each number, there is a fact of the matter whether it is in the 
collection or not.  Later I will consider “indeterminate collections” (starting with the 
question of what that could even mean). 
How should such an interval be understood? What one wants to say is that we are taking 
about an interval of values that are, in some sense, “close enough”.  But close enough to 
what? For realism, as we have construed it, in a given problem situation there must BE a 
value closeness to which counts as “close enough” however that is to be understood. But 
for all the reasons given above, there is nothing in the problem situation that fixes the 
needed objective value. 
For the case of working quantities there is a more careful way to make out the interval 
intuition. Let’s see how this goes for speed of sound in air. To review the problem, 
specifying a quantity as “speed of sound in air” is, as VIM and GUM would put it, an 
incomplete definition.  Liquefied air?  Ionized air?  It is plausible that all such extreme 
cases can be eliminated with a short list of more specific conditions:  Air at temperature T 
= 273.15º K and pressure p = 101,325 Pa.  But such characterizations of the quantity are 
still open ended: in the present example temperature +/- .005º K and pressure +/- .5 Pa.  
The proposed solution, in the spirit of supervaluationism, suggests that we get our 
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interval by considering ALL the ways in which the characterization could be made 
completely precise.  To put it once more metaphorically, consider the possible worlds 
each having some precise value for the quantities in question (temperature, pressure,), the 
range of possible worlds fixed by the limits in such incomplete specification of the 
quantities and that are otherwise maximally similar to the actual world.  Our required 
interval (or other collection) of values will be the values in one or another of such 
possible worlds. 
  Such an interval would be objective.  The statement of realist accuracy would have to be 
restated: Instead of distance from some one value there would have to be some relation to 
the interval of question.  This could be done in a variety of ways, the details don’t matter.  
This proposal collapses, in different ways, depending on how velocity is understood.  
Let’s suppose, which is what one usually has in mind, that it is instantaneous velocity that 
is in question.  Again, this is an idealization: there is no such thing in the real world.  The 
proposal is to consider a range of possible worlds that differ from the real world only by 
having one or another precise value of the associated quantities, such as pressure and 
temperature, that are within the bounds of the interval specified in the detailed 
characterization of the condition of the air in which the speed of sound is in question. 
(For the moment we are waving the problems with both pressure and temperature, which, 
when reintroduced, further spoil the effort.)  But with these worlds differing from the real 
world only by variation of the exact parameter values within the given bounds, these 
possible worlds will also have no instantaneous velocities.  If velocity means 
instantaneous velocity, the proposal is empty. 
The alternative is to consider some kind of average velocity in each of the relevant 
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possible worlds. But which?  No question but that there are averages – distance covered 
divided by the time of travel – that will work for practical purposes. (I’m taking the 
appeal to “practical purposes” to paper over the problems with appeal to the distance and 
time of travel. This broaches problems of vagueness, to be discussed in section 4.)  But 
the realist needs to be specific.  “Pick some average that works for our current objectives” 
doesn’t fit the bill in the actual world, let alone in all of the various possible worlds 
relevant in the proposed analysis. In addition there are problems with the averages 
themselves.  Wave or group velocity?  Wave velocity is strictly defined only for a wave 
that extends to infinity forward and backward.  And distance traveled in unit time brings 
in all the problems with measures of both distance and time – the problems we have 
already reviewed both for the units in question and for the more fundamental quantities – 
distance and time. 
The interval intuition fails, if anything, more radically, when it comes to units.  At first 
things look hopeful because we are told, for example, that the current practical accuracy 
for standards for the second is to five parts in 10-15  But what does this mean?  As we will 
learn in more detail below, it means that concrete standard realizations can be built to 
agree to five parts in 10-15.  It’s not yet clear what that shows about some kind of 
objective interval in nature.  The agreement in practice clearly has some kind of 
controlling objective element in as much as nature makes us work very hard to get the 
agreement. But to what one thing “in nature”, whether point valued or precise interval, in 
terms of which realist-accuracy might be characterized, does this “objective element” 
correspond? 
Unlike the case of working quantities, there is no natural candidate for the needed 
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interval.  For working quantities one plausibly turned to all the different ways in which an 
incomplete specification of the working quantity might be filled in.  But in addressing the 
idealizations involved in the characterization of a unit there is no natural or well-defined 
range of cases of what will count as a deidealization.  The only constraint on 
deidealization is that past successes be preserved, that in the case of units amounts to the 
successes in getting real world realizations to agree at least as well as before any new 
deidelization.  But what would be meant by the “interval of deidealizations” that might 
sustain the level of agreement that we now achieve in practice? 
Dimensional quantities suffer, for this issue, the same problems as do units. Since 
dimensional quantities are abstract, unlike their concretizations in working quantities, the 
whole idea of an interval of refinements has no direct application. As in the case for units, 
any idea of an interval would have to be in terms of some range of deidealizations from 
the idealizations involved in the characterization of the dimensional quantity in question. 
It is obscure in the extreme what kind of an interval could correspond to departures of our 
current idealization from one or another possible “finally correct” definition of a quantity. 
There would have to be some kind of objective distance measure between our current 
idealized definition and what a “final definition” might be.  As In the case of units the 
only current constraint on a “final definition” is that it preserve current successes. But in 
the case of dimensional quantities, creatures of fundamental theories, the success of a 
fundamental theory is entirely entangled with the work done by other theories, 
fundamental and non-fundamental. What would it mean to say that this success delimits 
some kind of “interval”, or other collection of cases reflecting facts about nature? 
3. How to understand measurement accuracy 
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3.1 What to make of all these considerations.  
For a variety of reasons, in any instance of measurement there is no completely specific 
value that is determined by the total situation that fixes the objective (though unknown) 
accuracy, in the sense of difference between some supposed actual value and the value 
that is the measurement outcome.  We have considered and found wanting an effort to 
substitute some kind of interval or other collection of values for an objective value. Yet, 
there is no denying that in any actual case of measurement  there is a range of values that 
are, as a matter of objective fact, reasonable ones that could be used, and comparison 
with any of which gives a measure of accuracy. Note the shift, in the last sentence, to the 
epistemic notion of reasonably assigned values.  These are still objective, in as much as 
there is a right and a wrong, or at least a more or less reasonable, that constrain what we 
should do and which indirectly reflect what is going on in a world too complicated for us 
to know exactly. 
For a sensible idea of how this works, we should look at how metrologists evaluate 
accuracy.14 
3.2: How metrologists evaluate accuracy: Robustness accuracy. As I have been at 
pains to emphasize, our understanding of quantities and how they might be measured is 
hostage to our currently best theories.  Time is characterized by GTR, temperature by 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, and so on.  Also central are theories that 
describe the interrelation of the quantity in question with other quantities.  Where time is 
measured by periodic motion, crucial are theories of the motions in question.  The current 
definition of the second appeals to a spectral emission of cesium, the theory of which 
calls on quantum field theory.  Temperature is measured by the temperature dependence 
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of other quantities such as volumes of gasses and liquids, the electrical properties of 
substances, and again spectral properties of electromagnetic emissions for heated 
substances.  Designing and evaluating measuring instruments for temperature requires 
applying the theories of these substances and the relation of temperature to their other 
properties.   
Let’s look in a little more detail at how this plays out in the case of determination of 
units.  A unit, such as the second or the kilogram, is given a theoretical or physical 
“definition”.  The theoretical characterizations require various idealizations, such as 0ºK 
and a zero gravitational potential.  The physical prototype for the kilogram functions as a 
fixed standard only under idealizations such as no scratches when handled and no 
absorption of impurities. The theoretical characterizations then must be physically 
realized. While the prototype for the kilogram is already physically realized, the same 
problems that arise for physical realization of theoretically defined units arise for a 
physically defined unit with the need to make copies. The physical realizations or 
copying depart from the idealized theoretical definitions and ideal circumstances assumed 
for a physical standard.  To make effective use of a standard one must, in physically 
realizing or copying, insofar as possible, minimize these departures from the idealized 
definitions and conditions; and one further appeals to any relevant theory for help in 
further correcting for departures from the idealizations insofar as these departures still 
affect the physical realizations and copies.  As we have seen, such deidealization cannot 
be done in any perfectly exact way, and what we come up with is hostage to the theories 
we use.  Still, these theories are the best account of nature that we have, and we use them 
as best we can.   
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Metrologists work to keep track of such departures from the idealizations with what they 
call “uncertainty budgeting” that appeals to theory to estimate the uncertainties that arise 
as a result of failure to completely deidealize.15  To be sure, these departures are not from 
something exactly fixed in nature but from standards that are as characterized by theories 
that are themselves idealized. That is, it is understood that these uncertainty estimates are 
relative to the theories used and thus limited by the shortcomings of these theories.  In 
consistency with all of the worries of section 2, these are not estimated departures from 
something fixed in nature but from the ideal depicted by what we take to be our best 
theories. 
It is these estimated uncertainties, deployed in a robustness condition, that then provide 
the basis for attributing a level of accuracy to a measurement standard. In Tal’s account 
of the special case of the standard second one uses  
two interlocking lines of inquiry: on the one hand metrologists work to 
increase the level of detail with which they model clocks.  On the other hand, 
clocks are continually compared to each other in light of their most recent 
theoretical and statistical models. The uncertainty budget associated with a 
standard is then considered sufficiently detailed if and only if these two lines 
of inquiry yield consistent results.  The upshot of this method is that the 
uncertainty ascribed to a standard clock is deemed adequate if and only if the 
outcomes of that clock converge to those of other clocks within the 
uncertainties ascribed to each clock by appropriate models, where 
appropriateness is determined by the best currently available theoretical 
knowledge and data-analysis methods.  (Tal 2011, 1091) 
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We have essentially the same story for the accuracy of measuring instruments proper.  
One provides a theoretical model for an instrument, relying on theory to minimize, 
insofar as possible, the uncertainties in the sense given above.  Insofar as practicable, 
such models will take into consideration all the factors that, according to current theory, 
might affect the measurement process.  One then uses these models to estimate the 
residual uncertainties, the inaccuracies to which the instrument might still be subject, 
once again according to our best theories.  All the estimated uncertainties are combined, 
and combined with the over all uncertainty in the unit standard used in the calibration of 
the instrument.  
The estimated uncertainties, deployed in a robustness condition, then provide the basis 
for attributing a level of accuracy to an instrument.  Tal’s summary is: 
Given multiple, sufficiently diverse processes that are used to measure the same 
quantity, the uncertainties ascribed to their outcomes are adequate if and only if  
  (i) discrepancies among measurement outcomes fall within their ascribed 
uncertainties; and  
 (ii) the ascribed uncertainties are derived from appropriate [as described above] 
models of each measurement process.  (Tal 2012, 175) 
 
Uncertainties that satisfy this robustness condition qualify as reliable measures of the 
accuracies of the measurement outcomes of the instruments in question. 
3.3  But why should such uncertainties count as measures of accuracy? One may take 
the robustness condition to proceed in the following spirit.16  The world is too 
complicated for us to be able to describe it exactly as it is.  We have to rely on a network 
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of (not always exactly consistent) idealized theoretical accounts.  But we use these 
accounts precisely because they give us a good enough picture to get along for a wide 
range of objectives.  The uncertainties that figure in the robustness condition are not 
interpreted as uncertainties of departure from the realists’ actually occurring values17 but 
as departures from values that we can suppose would occur in the idealized 
circumstances described by our theories.  Broadly, our composite idealized accounts are 
good enough to be highly reliable and it is just a special case of this over all reliability 
that we won’t get into trouble by treating departures from supposed idealized values of 
idealized quantities characterized in idealized units as departures from postulated actually 
occurring values of real quantities described in exactly characterized units. In the larger 
idealized picture of the subject matter the measurement outcome is off by some (not 
exactly known) definite value from WHAT IT WOULD BE IN THE (OR SOME) 
SIMPLIFIED WORLD  characterized by our idealized larger picture.18 
Accuracy realism fails because of reference failure, and reference fails because of, a fact 
that we too easily let drop out of view, the ubiquitous idealizations of our theoretical 
accounts of the world.  We forget the idealized status of our theories precisely because 
they work so well and so broadly.  Generally speaking, we get on successfully treating 
the world as characterized by the idealized dimensional quantities, specified in idealized 
units, and then applied more specifically with the idealized concrete versions provided by 
working quantities.  In short, we proceed AS IF the presupposition of traditional 
measurement accuracy realism were true.  In other words, the presupposition of accuracy 
realism is itself an additional idealization, or perhaps a collective application of prior 
idealizations.   
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Measurement standards function for us as the bench marks against which measurement 
accuracy is evaluated.  But that comes down to saying that we treat objects as having 
values for quantities as characterized in terms of our current measurement standards.  On 
the one hand, we know that these standards are always susceptible to improvement, in 
ways in part marked by the ascribed uncertainties.  But at any moment we can do no 
better than to treat the world as characterized in terms of these standards, that is, as if the 
world were just as so characterized. Acknowledging that improvement is always an 
option comes to acknowledging that using a standard as our guide to the world is an 
idealization.  
The robustness condition is essential to the success of so proceeding. The condition 
functions as a prescription to check, check with great thoroughness, that the various ways 
in which we assign values to quantities as described in our theories all fit together well 
enough not to engender difficulties.19 The robustness condition functions precisely to 
insure that taking the presupposition of accuracy realism, made concrete in terms of our 
measurement standards, as an additional idealization or collective application of 
antecedent idealizations, does not spoil the larger operation of the sketch of the world 
provided by concrete application of our interconnected idealized models and theories.  
The current proposal is not to scrap the concept of traditional accuracy realism in favor of 
some substantially different concept.  Rather I am urging a change in how we think about 
the concept. We apply the familiar concept but no longer in a traditional realist spirit. 
Instead we appreciate its status as an idealization. Consider some specific measurement 
situation with an object of measurement being evaluated for the value of some quantity as 
characterized by our relevant current theories.  Satisfaction of the robustness condition 
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insures that if one were to use any realization of the available measurement standards for 
this quantity one would get the same value up to the tolerances characterized by the 
uncertainty budgeting. Given this reliable consistency one won’t get into trouble by 
idealizing, by thinking of the situation as one in which there IS a quantity characterized 
by our theories, a unit set by the measurement standards, and that the object has a value 
for that quantity in those units. This last is just to say in the material mode exactly what is 
reexpressed in the formal mode by saying that the expression 
There is a quantity characterized by our theories, a unit set by the measurement standards, 
and that the object has a value for that quantity in those units 
has precise referents, the quantity, the units and the value in question.  We know that 
these expressions do not have referents, but there is much practical advantage and no 
harm is done by treating them as if they did. 
As for the accuracy of some instrument that is not part of the system of measurement 
standards, we think of it, within the scope of the idealization, as the difference between 
the measurement result and the supposed actual value.  Of course even if the world were 
as in the idealization, the best we could do to get that supposed value would be the values 
of one or another measurement standard, qualified by the uncertainty budget.  But since 
in the real world the very best we could presently do would be exactly those results of 
one or another measurement standard, in practice what we can have is exactly what we 
would have if the world were as in the idealization.  With the robustness condition in 
place the idealization can’t get us into trouble.     
4. Quantities and units understood as vague.  
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Some readers will have been thinking throughout:  The problems here are all problems 
having to do with vagueness.  So there is no special problem here, nothing problematic 
over and above whatever general problems there may be with vagueness.  
I agree, at least for the case of working quantities and units.  The proposal, however does 
not work for the case of dimensional quantities.  In this section I will examine the 
connection and argue that treatment in terms of vagueness and in terms of idealization as 
in the last section are really two different ways of getting at the same thing. Certain 
advantages accruing to working with idealization, starting with the circumstance that 
framing in terms of idealization, gives a uniform treatment of dimensional quantities 
along with units and working quantities, also thereby providing a kind of generalization 
of the notion of vagueness.  
On its face, ‘accurate’ is vague in exactly the way that ‘flat’ is vague – ‘accurate’ is not 
the target there.  Rather it is the expressions that have the form of picking out units, 
quantities and their values.  
Compare: 
The temperature of the water in this glass 
The time at which John arrived home. 
There is no one temperature that counts as the temperature of the water in this glass.  If 
you think that temperature is an intrinsic quality of objects no one number will do – any 
real body of water in a glass will have some temperature gradients.  Perhaps you want to 
take a statistical mechanical definition of temperature, the mean kinetic energy of all the 
molecules in the glass – but this too will suffer fluctuations and is, in any case, a classical 
idealization.  Likewise there is no one precise moment that counts as the moment at 
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which John arrived home.  When he pulled his car into the driveway (and just which 
moment was that)? When he stepped over the threshold? When he hung his hat on the hat 
rack…? ‘The time at which John arrived home’ is vague, and in an analogous  way so is 
‘The temperature of the water in this glass’. 
Note that this proposal importantly differs from the interval proposal considered in 
section 2.6: There is no determinate interval of values that could count as the time of 
John’s arrival; and likewise no determinate interval of values that could count as the 
water’s temperature.  Below we will consider how to make sense of a contrasting 
“indeterminate” collection of values. 
If working quantity terms are vague, then there appears to be a simple way to characterize 
‘accurate’. Let’s call the imprecisely characterized collection of values that would work 
for the temperature of the water in this glass the “temperature value collection”.  We 
could then characterize  
Accurate (enough): Close enough for present purposes to any one (or almost any 
one) of the values in the temperature value collection. 
Problem solved! On this analysis, ‘accurate’ comes out as doubly vague: vague in the 
“enough” (compare:  flat (enough) ), but also vague in the “the values in the in the 
temperature value collection”.  
We understand this approach precisely as well as we understand “temperature value 
collection.” Again, section 2.6 rejected the option of saying that, though imprecisely 
characterized, there must BE some determinate interval or other collection of values that 
is in question.  We need to develop some alternative way of thinking about what is going 
on when we talk about such intervals or collections. 
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Let’s work this though for “the time at which John arrived home”.  Suppose that we 
check the security camera and find that John turned off his car at 4:59:32, crossed the 
threshold at 5:00:02 and his hat hit the hook on the hat rack at 5:00:05.  For virtually any 
practical purpose that might come up you could use any of these times for “the time at 
which John arrived home”, as well as many others that are, from a practical point of view 
“close enough”, though 5:00:00 would be the obvious practical choice.  Which numbers 
could be used is open ended in the sense that which ones would be appropriate choices 
depends on what is at issue, in turn fixed by the context, but “the context” itself will shift 
from case to case and in no case will be specific in every respect. At the margins one is 
free to cut the edges as one likes, and when the margins are fine enough choices will be 
arbitrary. 
 There is no determinate collection of values that qualify.  There are only the 
practical questions of what numbers will serve, and how well, for practical issues.  
 Yes: the approach illustrated in this example supplies an approach that could be 
applied very generally to the phenomenon of vagueness.  Tal’s robustness analysis is 
attractive because it provides a basis for making out this kind of thinking in an 
exceptionally general and coherent way for the case of measurement accuracy. 
 I do not know of any explicit development of this approach to vagueness in the 
vast vagueness literature.  The usual way of dealing with the worry of indeterminately 
specified collections is the hierarchy of higher order borderline cases. Such developments 
may provide interesting formal constructions, but they are terrible models of vagueness 
of terms in natural languages and in particular in the languages of science.  A borderline 
case is a case in which one is appropriately unsure about what to say.  A borderline
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borderline case would be one in which one is appropriately not sure whether one is 
appropriately unsure about what to say – something that in some cases we can make 
sense of, but something that in practice arises extremely rarely, if ever. The third order 
case goes beyond any normal human capacity or need, and so beyond anything that 
corresponds to the function of human language.  The pragmatic approach to vagueness 
fits these conditions perfectly. 
Understanding vagueness as a practical question of applicability makes it easy to see the 
connection with idealization. In the case of the temperature of the water in this glass, 
given practical and theoretical questions of applicability that might come up we have 
some latitude as to which number to use for the temperature.  Choice of any one is an 
idealized description of a much more messy real world situation. An idealization is, 
strictly speaking, false. But within its domain of applicability one can use it as if the 
world were just as the idealization says it is.  That is, for a suitable range of practical or 
theoretical questions the idealization functions as a precisification of a corresponding 
imprecisely characterized situation.  In the case of the temperature of the water in our 
glass, postulating a precise value for the temperature is a precisification of the 
imprecisely characterized temperature value collection, one that is appropriate just when 
it is one of the values that arise in the practical analysis of the kind we have seen above.  I 
call precisely stated idealizations and corresponding imprecise, or vague, 
characterizations “semantic alter egos” because they are different ways of accomplishing 
the same semantic work. 20 21 
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But working with idealizations has the advantage that it will apply in the treatment of 
dimensional quantities where, I will now argue, thinking in terms of vagueness no longer 
applies. 
To understand a vague term requires understanding how to make it more precise.  This 
we can easily do for working quantities. For units I could make a case either way, 
depending on how we make more precise the vague “understanding how to make it more 
precise”. But dimensional quantities can’t be forced into this mold for the kinds of 
reasons that already came up when we discussed the precise interval option for 
dimensional quantities. What would count as precisifications for terms for dimensional 
quantities would be de-idealizations.  But for our currently most detailed theoretical 
account of a dimensional quantity we have no idea how to de-idealize – if we did we 
would already have these proposed theories on the table! 
To make this out in more detail requires addressing a complication.  If the issue is put, 
not in terms of an attribute of theory, idealization, but instead an attribute of language, 
vagueness, we have also to bring in the phenomenon of ambiguity because many of the 
relevant idealizations in question will correspond to ambiguity rather than vagueness.  
Vagueness – susceptibility to precisification from an indefinite range of refinements – 
and ambiguity – susceptibility to disambiguation from a determinate, very limited 
collection of determinate meanings – are not the same phenomenon.22 For many 
theoretical considerations about language they must be distinguished.  But for our 
purposes we can lump them together. The two share the relevant feature that to 
understand a vague/ambiguous term in a way that involves awareness of the 
vagueness/ambiguity requires knowing how to make the term more precise/knowing how 
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to disambiguate the term.  While not absolutely clear, it is at least odd and/or misleading 
to say that a term, as used in a language community,  is vague or ambiguous even though 
no one in the community has any awareness of that vagueness or ambiguity or any 
understanding of how to precisify or disambiguate the term. 
The kind of problem we are considering for dimensional quantities turns on variation in 
the discrete parameter, theory.  Consider, for example, mass.  As the term is now used it 
is ambiguous, between rest mass and relativistic mass. But this is only post 1905!  I 
submit that as used before 1905 the term ‘mass’ was not ambiguous – it referred to 
Newtonian mass, now best understood as rest mass. Before 1905 no one knew of the 
relativistic alternative so disambiguation was not an option.23 
The case for dimensional quantities differs from that of units and working quantities in 
two ways.  First, it is ambiguity, not vagueness that is in question.  From the perspective 
of our present interests this is an irrelevant difference.  But second, when it comes to the 
dimensional quantities as characterized in our currently most detailed theory, the terms 
for dimensional quantities do not count as ambiguous.  As noted above, if we could 
disambiguate this would be by appeal to more detailed theory that, in the cases in 
question, we do not have.   
But the cases in which we can precicify/disambgiguate and those in which we can’t still 
have in common the underlying source – idealization.  We can appreciate that our 
characterization involves idealization.  But we may or may not know how, at least to 
some extent, to de-idealize.  When we do know, we have vagueness or ambiguity; when 
we do not know we don’t.  This is the reason for which our present subject is more 
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perspicuously approached in terms of idealization rather than vagueness and ambiguity.   
5. Concluding Thoughts.  
I have argued for the systematic failure of reference for referring terms for quantities and 
their values.  We have seen this failure as a kind of generalized kind of vagueness (and 
ambiguity).  Since vagueness is a ubiquitous aspect of language, in and out of science, 
this suggests that reference failure is likewise a very general feature of language.  Braun 
and Sider claim just this, taking this circumstance to be sufficiently obvious that no 
argument is required: 
[T]he facts that determine meaning (for instance, facts about use, naturalness of 
properties, and causal relations between speakers and properties) do not determine 
a unique property to be the meaning of ‘red’ [and likewise for expressions very 
broadly] (Braun and Sider 2007, 134) 
We can see section 2 as showing in detail that this is so in the special case of terms for 
quantities, their units, and their values. 
Just as section 2’s problem of reference failure – aka generalized vagueness/ambiguity – 
generalizes to all human representation, I urge that the response in section 3 likewise 
generalizes: It is through idealizations that we know the world.  The world is too complex 
for us to have representations that characterize it exactly, that is with both perfect 
precision and perfect accuracy.  Our representations always fall short in one or both of 
these two ways. This is as true of perceptual as of theoretical knowledge. But we do 
know a great deal. Knowing the world is knowing the world through idealizations, and 
insofar imperfectly.    
It is a fair question, what is it to know the world through idealizations?  This is a question 
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on which I have touched in many other articles24 but which needs much more thought and 
discussion. Indeed, it requires a wholesale overhaul of our understanding of human 
knowledge.  For the moment I will leave it with the suggestion that the present treatment 
of measurement accuracy and its appeal to Tal’s robustness condition provides an 
exemplar that can usefully guide our thinking.   
The problem I have discussed in section 2 is the semantic problem of reference failure, 
not an epistemic problem of difficulty in knowing values that are alleged to have been 
fixed.  But the suggestion of this section is that ubiquitous reference failure gives rise to a 
very different epistemic limitation, that we know the world only through idealizations. 
Philosophical tradition to the contrary not withstanding, knowing imperfectly is still 
knowing what the world is like; in particular, that the world is very like one occupied by 
such and such idealized objects with such and such idealized characteristics. One doesn’t 
have to get it exactly right about what things there are and their properties. There is a 
difference between getting things wrong in ways or to an extent that do not presently 
matter and getting things badly or completely wrong. Complete precision and accuracy is 
not humanly attainable and also not needed.  Imperfect knowledge is still knowledge of 
the world, we can add redundantly, of the way the world is REALLY. This isn’t 
traditional realism, but it is the sensible way in which we should have been understanding 
realism all along.   
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ENDNOTES 
                                            
1 As readers will see, this paper draws heavily from Eran Tal’s (2011 and 2012).  In 
effect, I am offering my own more detailed interpretation of parts of his work. I have also 
profited greatly from comments on a draft of this paper from Tal, as well as from Michela 
Massimi, Bas van Fraassen, and Ron Giere. 
2 I have written about measurement precision in (Teller 2012) 
3 Reference to units is a short way to cover the point that what is postulated are not values 
as numbers, in some Platonic sense, but a ratio or other relation between the quantity Q, 
as it applies to O, and the quantity Q as it applies to some reference object (e.g., 
international prototype kilogram) or condition (e.g., the radiation spectrum of cesium) 
that sets the units. 
4 I do not consider the view I present in this paper to be ant-realist.  Indeed, as I will 
explain in the paper’s last paragraph, the present view is the sensible way that realism 
should have been understood all along.   
5 Nor would I claim that there are such things “in nature”, whatever that might mean.  
This paper is entirely agnostic about this question.  If the reader MUST know what my 
private view is on this matter, let me just say that it is deeply Kantian. 
6 As argued by Tal who concludes that 
In order to individuate quantities across measuring procedures, one has to 
determine whether the outcomes of different procedures can be consistently 
modeled in terms of the same parameter in the background theory. If the answer 
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is ‘‘yes’’, then these procedures measure the same quantity relative to those 
models. (2012, 84  Italics in original) 
This quotation also makes it clear that Tal is here referring to dimensional quantities, as 
opposed to what I will below call working quantities.     
7 I will be referring to two documents published by the Joint Committee for Guidelines in 
Metrology (JCGM): the International Vocabulary of Metrology, or VIM, and the 
Evaluation of Measurement Data – Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in 
Measurement, or GUM.  The references will be by section number. 
8  If, with VIM and GUM, we take “definitions” of quantities to includes such detailed 
specification of properties, air with these differing quantity values count as different 
quantities.  On this interpretation no specific quantity has been picked out.  
9 Bureau International des Poids and Measures, 
http://www.bipm.org/en/si/si_brochure/chapter2/2-1/second.html 
10 I will use ‘idealization’ very broadly to characterize any representational inaccuracy.  
This can, but need not be understood as in comparison with some absolute standard.  The 
alternative is to think of inaccuracy of a representation as what is so characterized from 
the point of view of some other representation that improves on the first in the sense of 
preserving all past and improving on the descriptive successes of the first representation. 
(Clearly in this note I am using ‘accurate’ and ‘inaccurate’ in a much broader sense than 
in the rest of the paper.) 
11 See Tal (2011, 1088-1090) 
12 It is a sensible question whether the problems that use of idealizations generates here 
are special to the case of measurement, quantities, units, and accuracy; or whether they 
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are really more general.  I urge the reader to put this question aside for the moment and 
focus on the arguments.  In section 5 I will address the question of whether these 
problems are really more general.           
13  BIPM, http://www.bipm.org/en/si/base_units/metre.html 
14 In what follows I am closely following Tal (2011) and (2012  chapter 4). 
15 I follow Tal (2011) especially pp. 1090-1093 
16 Tal appears to have a different attitude towards his robustness condition.  He never 
considers possible failure of the presupposition of what I am calling traditional 
measurement accuracy realism.  See his (2011, 1094). 
17 Although they might also be that.  Remember that this paper does not argue that there 
are no potential referents in nature but that, should there be such, our terms fail to attach 
to them.   
18 Remember that I am using ‘idealization’ very broadly to characterize any 
representation that stands to be improved by being made more accurate in some way 
where “improved” may be understood as relative to some descriptively more successful 
representation. See note 10. 
19 Note that this way of thinking of the robustness condition differs from thinking of it as 
a regulative ideal of bringing language and reality into perfect alignment. I don’t think 
that these attitudes exclude one another.  It would be a very useful way to further explore 
these issues to consider the pros and cons of both these attitudes.   
20 See my (2011 and forthcoming) for much more detail. 
21 Once the connection between idealization and vagueness is made, section 2 functions 
as an extended argument against epistemic accounts of vagueness. 
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22 See  Bromberger (2012, 75-8 and passim.) 
23 A slightly more careful version of this account:  Prerelativistically, ‘mass’ was 
ambiguous between inertial mass, gravitational mass, and the pretheoretic quantity of 
matter.  Newtonian inertial mass was non-relational, and in special relativity it is replaced 
by relativistic inertial mass that is relative to an inertial frame.  This makes inertial mass, 
post 1905, ambiguous in a way similar to the ambiguity in ‘heaviness’, ambiguous 
between the relational quantity, weight, and the non-relational quantity, mass, a 
dimension of relationality that layers on the foregoing. I differ from van Fraassen (2002,  
115-6) who at least suggests that ‘inertial mass’ was somehow tacitly ambiguous before 
1905.   
24  See my 2004, 2009a, 2009b, 2001, and forthcoming. 
